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Land warfare - counter-insurgency operations

9/11 Commission Report

This is the full text pdf version of the report (7.4 Mb). It is the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also know as the 9-11 Commission) which was set up to investigate the events surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. It looks at the hijacking of the airliners and the response to the terrorist attacks, the calls for terrorist attacks on America since 1992, the formation and organisation of Al Qaeda, the evolution of counterterrorism and intelligence since the first World Trade Center bombing, responses to Al Qaeda's initial assaults, preparedness and emergency response and the War on Terrorism.

Afghanistan : Reconstituting a Collapsed State

This is the full text pdf version of a Strategic Studies Institute monograph published in April 2005 and written by Raymond A. Millen. It looks at the reconstruction of Afghanistan following Operation Enduring Freedom, the role of warlords in impeding Afghanistan's revival and examines strategies for post conflict operations and counterinsurgency.

Air Power and Special Forces: A Symbiotic Relationship

This is Australian Air Power Development Centre (formerly the Air Power Studies Centre) Working Paper 14 by Squadron Leader David Jeffcoat, February 2004. This paper attempts to draw out the synergy between the characteristics of air power and Special Forces that come together so powerfully to make it a formidable combination, and describes its implications for the application of precision firepower. It suggests that the relationship between the two and the increased effectiveness that the combination brings to a battle should be optimised and further exploited.

Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era. The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions

This technical report (MG-509-AF) was published by The RAND Corporation in 2006 and was written by Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill and Karl P. Mueller. Often treated by Americans as an exceptional form of warfare, insurgency is anything but. Spanning the globe, centuries, and societies, insurgency is quite common. Given the threat insurgency presents to U.S. interests and allies around the world, the importance of counterinsurgency is no surprise. However, history has shown that insurgencies are rarely defeated by outside powers. Rather, the best role for outsiders is an indirect one: training, advising, and equipping the local nation, which must win the war politically and militarily. And while counterinsurgency might seem to be a task most suited to ground forces, air power has much to contribute. These facts combine to suggest that advising, training, and equipping partner air forces will be a key component of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts worldwide. The authors note that, if the Air Force is to participate in these tasks, it will need to make counterinsurgency an institutional priority, developing the capabilities of its personnel both as advisors and trainers and as combatants, as well as developing the necessary institutional support structures. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations

This technical report (MG-565-AF) was produced by The RAND Corporation in 2007 and was written by Robert C. Owen and Karl P. Mueller. Current and probable future United States involvement in counterinsurgencies revives a long-standing debate about whether these missions call for adding specialized aircraft, training, or other resources to the general military airlift fleet. The authors examine the use of airlift in past and present counterinsurgency operations, including the Foreign Internal Defense program. They conclude that general U.S. airlift forces can accomplish most counterinsurgency missions effectively, with adjustments in employment doctrines and training. However, they also note that continued operations likely will require reinforcement of the general airlift fleet and, perhaps, acquisition of a small fleet element optimized for certain counterinsurgency missions. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

Back to Basics: Avaition Solution to Counter-Insurgent Warfare

This is the full text of a thesis by Major Arthur Davis which was presented to the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) in 2005. This study focuses on the current War on Terror as a conflict against insurgents attacking US power wherever it shows itself through asymmetric means. The primary target of late has been military and civilian convoy operations in Iraq and, to some extent, Afghanistan. By examining past examples of the use of airpower in counterinsurgent warfare, this study will shed light on current failings in both equipment and doctrine on behalf of the US in waging this type of war. The French used low technology aircraft in Algeria to attack insurgent forces and defend ground troops. The aircraft that were employed were WWII vintage T-6 and A-1 fighters that proved well adapted to the environment and this reason, coupled with the manner in which they were deployed and employed made the difference in containing and defeating the insurgents. In Vietnam, the US employed T-28 and A-1 aircraft as they were ideally suited to training the South Vietnamese Air Force and had a proven track record in this type of war. The US should re-think its inventory of aircraft devoted to counterinsurgent war by looking at possible replacements for the A-1. Coupled with this should be a re-evaluation of the manner in which these assets are employed by having them located with the ground forces they are meant to support. [Taken from abstract]. The full text is available in PDF format and is provided by the Air University ResearchWeb site.

Backgrounder : Iraq's Insurgency After Zarqawi

Provided by the Council on Foreign Relations in June 2006 and written by Lionel Beehner, this paper looks at the implications of the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi the leader of the al Qaeda foreign contingent of the insurgency in post war Iraq. It looks at the impact Zarqawis death could have on the insurgency; how he was viewed by radical muslims; the hierarchy of Zarqawi's terrorist network; how US led counterterrorism strategy could change; and how his death will affect the new Iraqi government. The site links to related material including a podcast on the legacy of Zarqawi, a profile of Zarqawi and news briefings.

BBC News In Depth : Somalia in Crisis

Provided by the BBC News website, this is a special in depth report on the conflict in Somalia. It provides the latest news reports on the insurgency; guides to Somalia's Islamists, key leaders, timelines and country profiles. There are also reports and analysis on United States interest in the conflict and the peace process.

Bounding the Global War on Terrorism

This pdf report was written by Dr Jeffrey Record, and published by the US Army War College, Security Studies Institute in December 2003. The report examines the three years of the War on Terror, since its inception in September 2001. It focuses on three areas; the American administraion's postulation of the terrorist threat, the scope and feasability of the United States' war aims, and the war's fiscal, political and military sustainability. The author calls for a bounding of the war on terror and reducing its scope to more accurately reflect US security interests and to bring clarity and clear objectives to the mission.

Counter Terrorism in Somalia : Losing Hearts and Minds?

This is the full text pdf version of International Crisis Group Africa Report No. 95, published on 11th July 2005. The report looks at the rise of an independent jihadi network in Mogadishu from 2003, which is believed to have links to Al Qaeda and the US led counter terrorism response. Since the formation of the new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for Somalia, in October 2004, tensions between terrorists and counter-terrorist operatives in Mogadishu have increased and the country is at risk of further jihadism and extreme violence unless the root causes of the conflict are tackled. The report looks at the new jihadis; the Somaliland killings; the Al Qaeda connections and Mombasa attacks; international relations with the US and Ethiopia; terrorist attacks; and public perceptions of the counter terrorist operations and engaging with the public, civil society organisations and moderate Islamist groups.

Countering Urban Terrorism in Russia and the United States : Proceedings of a Workshop

This is a full text book made available by National Academies Press, eited by Glenn E. Schweitzer and A. Chelsea Sharber and published in 2006. Other contributing organisations: Committee on Counterterrorism, Challenges for Russia and the United States, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia, National Research Council, in cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences. The full text of the proceedings can be read in open book format from the website of the National Academies Press.

Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube. Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

This technical report (MG-551-JFCOM) was produced by The RAND Corporation in 2007 and was written by Russell W. Glenn. With a matter of weeks to prepare, Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) personnel landed on July 24, 2003, armed for conflict but equally ready to restore peace without firing a shot in anger. RAMSI’s aim was to assist the existing government in reestablishing order and rebuilding this island nation plagued by escalating militia violence, crime, and corruption. RAMSI police forces, with the much larger military component in a supporting role, were patrolling the streets alongside their Solomon Islands counterparts on the very day of arrival. This and many other early actions on the part of RAMSI leadership presented a clear and cohesive message that would characterize operations from that day forward: RAMSI had not come to take charge through the use of force, though it had the capability to do so; it had come to assist and protect. This study reviews the remarkable successes, and the few admitted shortcomings, of RAMSI operations through the lens of broader application to current and future counterinsurgency efforts. Foremost among these lessons is the need for consistency of mission and message from leadership down to the lowest echelons of an operation, ensuring that the population is appropriately and consistently informed. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

Counterinsurgency. A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962

This technical report (R-412-1-ARPA/RC) was published by The RAND Corporation in 2006 and was written by Stephen T. Hosmer and S. O. Crane. This report is based on the Symposium on Counterinsurgency held at RAND’s Washington Office during the week of 16 April 1962. The purpose of the symposium was to bring together those with first-hand experience of guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare for informal exchanges of information that might lead to fresh insights and a detailed body of expert knowledge. The subjects discussed include patterns and techniques of counterinsurgency, effective organizational and operational approaches, political action, psychological warfare, intelligence and counterintelligence, and requirements for victory. This new release of the report includes a new foreword by Stephen T. Hosmer that elucidates the relevance of this symposium to contemporary guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software is required in order to read it.

CSIS Features : Terrorism War Update

This site is provided by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and provides access to full text papers and analysis by Anthony H. Cordesman on the War on Terrorism, security challenges, the war in Afghanistan and the hunt for Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden.

FACSNET : The War on Terrorism

Provided by the Foundation of American Communications (FACS), an indepenedent not-for-profit educational organisation that provides background resources for journalists to enable quality reporting and news information. This particular site is devoted to the War on Terror. The site includes papers from a FACS conference on terrorism which brought together experts on foreign policy, bioterrorism and risk; discussions on the Office of Homeland Defense and its creation; information on terrorist groups and their agendas; US foreign policy and the Middle East; the cultural and religious context to terrorism; national security and civil rights and remembering September 11 2001.

Federation of American Scientists Para-States

This is a directory of para-states, liberation movements, terrorist organisations, substance cartels, and other para-state entities. The directory includes the perpatrators as well as the targets of direct action. It is not just a list of terrorist organisations, and includes states which are victims as well as ones which are authors of international criminal activity. Direct action includes acts of terrorism, cyber warfare, drugs trafficking, international organised crime, and secret use of weapons of mass destruction. Each organisation is examined and its activities to date listed.

Federation of American Scientists Terrorism, Intelligence Threat Assessment

This site contains various information on terrorism around the world, but mainly relating to the United States. There are many US government reports on the site, for example:- Countering the Threat of International Terrorism; US Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operation Plans; Patterns of Global Terrorism; Foreign Terrorist Organisation Designations; Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans. There are also documents, articles, and papers and newsgroups. There are links to US government sites as well as other sites dealing with terrorism. There are links to September 11th and the aftermath.

Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism : Second Report of Session 2002-03

This site provides access to the full text pdf version of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report, HC196 (incorporating HC 1196 session 2001-02), published in December 2002. This report follows on from an interim report on the UK Government response to the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks (HC 384 session 2001-02). It looks at; multilateral developments since June 2002 including EU and NATO actions against terrorism; developments in US foreign policy; an assessment of Al Qaeda; the threat from Iraq; disarming Iraq; the possibility of military action against Iraq; and the War on Terrorism including developments in the Arab world, Arab-Israeli conflict and Afghanistan.

Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism : Second Report of Session 2003-04 : Report Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence

This site provides access to the full text pdf version of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report, HC81, published in February 2004. It is part of a continuing assessment on the War on Terrorism and looks at developments since July 2003 in post conflict Iraq, the Israeli Palestinian conflict, threats to security in the Middle East region, the continuing threat from international terrorist networks, multilateral institutions (NATO, the EU and UN) and the war on terror.

Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism : Seventh Report of Session 2001-02 : Report, Together with Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices

This site provides access to the full text pdf version of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report, HC384, published in June 2002. It questions why the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks were not forseen and prevented. It then goes on to look at the phases of the war on terror; Phase I from the terrorist attacks to the overthrow of the Taliban, 11 September - 14 November 2001; and Phase II after the fall of the Taliban, 14 November 2001.

Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism : Seventh Report of Session 2003-04

This site provides access to the full text pdf version of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report, HC 441-I, pubished on 29th July 2004. It is part of a continuing assessment on the War on Terrorism and it follows on from previous reports which look at the international terrorist threat (HC 81 session 2003-04, HC 405 session 2002-03, HC 196 session 2002-03 and HC 384 session 2001-02). Topics covered include; post-war Iraq including the security situation, weapons of mass destruction, reconstruction, and political developments; Afghanistan including the political situation, reconstruction and security; Pakistan and its cooperation in the war against terrorism and nuclear proliferation; the Russian Federation including its commitment to the war on terrorism and the situation in Chechnya; the Israel Palestine conflict including the Road Map for peace; International law and the war on terror; and International cooperation to tackle terrorism.

Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism : Tenth Report of Session 2002-03

This site provides access to the full text pdf version of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report, HC 405, pubished in July 2003. It follows on from two previous reports which look at the international terrorist threat (HC 196 session 2002-03 and HC 384 session 2001-02) and HC 813-I The Decision to go to War in Iraq. It looks at the period January to June 2003 and covers; the threat from Iraq including weapon inspections, the decision to go to war, and the immediate postwar period; the FCO's response to international terrorism including efforts to disable Al Qaeda and related terrorist networks; and the War on Terror including the Israel-Palestine conflict, reform in teh Arab world, UK and US relations, and developing alternatives to regime change.

Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism

This is the full text pdf version of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report, HC 573, incorporating HC 904-I, published on 2nd July 2006. The chapters cover; the ongoing threat from terrorism including the international threat, developments in al Qaeda, public diplomacy and human rights in Guantanamo Bay; Saudi Arabia; the United Arab Emirates; Israel and Palestine; Iraq; Iran; Afghanistan; and non proliferation. The conclusions of the report are that al Qaeda remains a serious threat to the United Kingdom and its interests and that the security situation in post war Iraq has proved a powerful source of propaganda and training for international terrorists. The report also raises concerns over Iran's involvement in Iraq and its nuclear intentions; and the deterioration in security in Afghanistan.

Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths

This web site provides access to a United States Strategic Studies Institute publication written by Antulio Echevarria dated November 2005. Fourth Generation War (4GW) emerged in the late 1980s, but has become popular due to recent twists in the war in Iraq, and terrorist attacks worldwide. In brief, the theory holds that warfare has evolved through four generations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver, and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince an opponent's decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly. Further, the theory contends that this last form characterizes the terrorists' way of fighting today. Despite reinventing itself several times, the theory has several fundamental flaws that need to be exposed before it influences U.S. operational and strategic thinking. A critique of 4GW is both timely and important because examining the theory's assumptions exposes significant faults in other popular notions, such as the idea of nontrinitarian war, that might exert damaging influence over U.S. strategy and military doctrine. What we are really seeing in the war on terror and the campaign in Iraq and elsewhere is that the increased "dispersion and democratization of technology, information, and finance" brought about by globalization has given terrorist groups greater mobility and access worldwide. At this point, globalization seems to aid the nonstate actor more than the state, but states still play a central role in the support or defeat of terrorist groups or insurgencies. We would do well to abandon the theory of 4GW altogether, since it sheds very little, if any, light on this phenomenon. [Taken from abstract]. The full text is available in PDF format so Adobe Acrobat software is required in order to read it.

Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism

This web site provides access to a United States Strategic Studies Institute publication written by Daniel Byman dated November 2005. Washington must recognize that its allies, including those in the security forces, are often the source of counterinsurgency problems as well as the heart of any solution. The author argues that the ally's structural problems and distinct interests have daunting implications for successful U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. The nature of regimes and of societies feeds an insurgency, but the United States is often hostage to its narrow goals with regard to counterinsurgency and thus becomes complicit in the host-nation's self-defeating behavior. Unfortunately, U.S. influence often is limited as the allies recognize that America's vital interests with regard to fighting al-Qa'ida-linked groups are likely to outweigh any temporary disgust or anger at an ally's brutality or failure to institute reforms. Training, military-to-military contacts, education programs, and other efforts to shape their COIN capabilities are beneficial, but the effects are likely to be limited at best. [Taken from abstract]. The full text is available in PDF format so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

Heads We Win — The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN). RAND Counterinsurgency Study — Paper 1

This technical report (OP-168-OSD) was produced by The RAND Corporation in 2007 and was written by David C. Gompert. Current U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has relied heavily on the use of force against Islamist insurgents — a tactic that has increased their ranks. What is needed instead are stronger cognitive capabilities that will enable more effective COIN against an elusive, decentralized, and highly motivated insurgency — capabilities that will enable the United States to “fight smarter.” Cognitive COIN goes beyond information technology and encompasses comprehension, reasoning, and decisionmaking, the components that are most effective against an enemy that is quick to adapt, transform, and regenerate. Countering the challenges of a global insurgency demands the ability to understand it, shape popular attitudes about it, and act directly against it. The four cognitive abilities that are most important to COIN operations are anticipation, opportunism, decision speed, and learning in action, applied through rapid-adaptive decisionmaking. In 21st-century COIN, tight control and bureaucracy must yield to the power of networked intelligence, with each operative authorized to act, react, and adapt. With these notions as a backdrop, this paper offers concrete ideas for gaining the cognitive advantage in anticipating and countering the new global insurgency. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq

This site provides access to the full text pdf version of the RAND occasional paper, OP-127-IPC/CMEPP written by Bruce Hoffman and published in June 2004. The paper questions what has gone wrong with counterinsurgency operations in Iraq following the end of the 2003 Iraq War, the challenges faced by coalition forces to restore peace to the area and lessons for future counterinsurgency operations and planning.

Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy : Can the American Way of War Adapt?

Written by Colin S. Gray and published in March 2006 by the American War College Strategic Studies Institute. The monograph looks at the strategy and theory of irregular and asymmetric warfare and whether the theories are adequate to explain the concept. The paper finds that the theory is adequate but that the traditional American way of war is inadequate to meet current threats. It concludes that there is a mismatch between the American way of war and the capabilities needed for irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations in particular.

Legislation Related to the Attack of September 11, 2001

This site is provided by the Library of Congress THOMAS service, which provides legislative information freely to the public. It was created following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States of America in order to keep the public informed of changes to American legislation related to the terrorist attacks and counter terrorism laws. The site contains the full text of Bills and Resolutions signed into law and cover intelligence, aviation security, bioterrorism, border security and authorisation for the use of military force; Legislation with Floor Action including the Financial Anti Terrorism Act, Homeland Security Information Sharing Act, and the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001; and Legislation without Floor Action including Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001, and the Dirty Bomb Prevention Act. There is legislation from September 2001 to the end of October 2001.

London Prepared

Part of the UK government's Preparing for Emergencies initiative, this site provides public information and advice specifically on London's preparations for and responses to major incidents and emergencies. It contains the full text of London's Strategic Emergency Plan, which outlines the plans on which London's resilence is based and provides synopsis of key plans such as Command and Control Protocol, the Communication Protocol, the Mass Fatalities plan, the large-scale evacuation framework and the Site Clearance plan. There is also information on the London Resilience Team, anti terrorism public advice, advice for businesses, and links to information on preparation and prevention.

Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy

The author Mr Hal Brands describes the Merida Initiative by the Mexican and United States governments. The Merida Initiative is designed to combat the drug-fuelled violence which is growing in Mexico. The initiative aims to strengthen the Mexican police and armed forces, permitting them to take the initiative against Mexico’s powerful drug cartels. The author argues the Merida Initiative is unlikely to have a meaningful, long-term impact because it focusses on security, enforcement, and interdiction issues and does not tackle the deeper structural problems in Mexico. These problems, ranging from official corruption to U.S. domestic drug consumption, have so far frustrated Mexican attempts to subdue the cartels, and will likely hinder the effectiveness of the Merida Initiative as well. To make U.S. counternarcotics policy fully effective, it will be imperative to forge a more integrated approach to the “war on drugs.”

Military Policy Awareness Links : Terrorism

MiPALs are published by the National Defense University for the Military Education Research Library Network, MERLN. It provides links to full text documents and resources with a primary focus on United States counter terrorism strategy. The topics covered include general background information; government and defence policy; background documents; current news; international organisations; terrorist acts, financing, ideology and group and leader profiles; research and analysis including reports from the Government Accountability Office, Congressional Research Service, and RAND; news sources and online journals; and web gateways. The MiPAL can be browsed or searched and an RSS feed is available.

Money in the Bank - Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations. RAND Counterinsurgency Study - Paper 4

This occasional paper (OP-185-OSD) was produced by The RAND Corporation in 2007 and was written by Angel Rabasa, Lesley Anne Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko and Paraag Shukla. As insurgent threats evolve and assume new forms, the United States must also evolve in its ability to counter potentially prolonged threats in several parts of the world. Because of the potential for global reach in contemporary insurgencies, the ability to draw on lessons learned from past counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns using different historical cases can be valuable, helping current and future leaders prevent a repetition of mistakes and building a foundation on which to build contemporary responses. To this end, six historic COIN operations from the 19th and 20th centuries are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of U.S. involvement. Specific issues examined include the counterinsurgents’ ability to innovate and adapt, the need to find a way to recognize the threat, and tactics for confronting it. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

natochannel.tv

Short video clips on NATO activities including operations, interviews, news, summits and lectures. There are also selected archive clips from 1949 to date. There is a simple search facility which uses the title, keyword and description fields. The service offers options to create an RSS subscription, download clips and email clips to colleagues. In English.

On “Other War”. Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research

This technical report (MG-482-OSD) was published by The RAND Corporation in 2006 and was written by Austin Long. The challenges posed by insurgency and instability have proved difficult to surmount. This difficulty may embolden future opponents to embrace insurgency in combating the United States. Both the current and future conduct of the war on terror demand that the United States improve its ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This study makes recommendations for improving COIN based on RAND’s decades-long study of it. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958

This technical report (MG-478-1-ARPA/RC) was published by The RAND Corporation in 2006 and was written by David Galula. When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France, mired in similar wars for independence in its colonial territories, was in a poor position to cope with further upheaval. The Algerian strategy encompassed varying approaches and was more adaptable than that of the French, necessitating a rethinking of traditional counterinsurgency methods. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command in the district of Greater Kabylia, east of Algiers, at the height of the rebellion, and presents his theories on counterinsurgency and pacification. In the process, he confronts the larger political, psychological, and military aspects of the Algerian war, and provides a context for present-day counterinsurgency operations. This groundbreaking work retains its relevancy as a challenge to traditional counterinsurgency tactics and presents approaches to predicting, managing, and resolving insurgent and guerilla conflict. The parallels between the Algerian war and modern warfare are striking, and lessons can be extracted from French successes and failures in its drive to contain and manage the Algerian uprising. A new foreword by counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman elucidates the relevance of this historic study in the context of modern times. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

Preparing for the Proven Inevitable. An Urban Operations Training Strategy for America’s Joint Force

This technical report (MG-439-OSD/JFCOM) was published by The RAND Corporation in 2006 and was written by Russell W. Glenn, Jody Jacobs, Brian Nichiporuk, Christopher Paul, Barbara Raymond, Randall Steeb and Harry J. Thie. Because future military operations are likely to include actions in densely populated, built-up areas, joint and service training initiatives over the past decade have increasingly reflected an interest in preparing for such contingencies. To assist the military community in better orchestrating its resources to improve forcewide readiness for urban operations, RAND was asked to develop a joint urban training strategy for the period 2005-2011. This report presents that strategy and describes the process used to develop it. The study identifies areas in need of redress and proposes ways in which the services — Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force — and other critical components of national capability can better ready themselves cooperatively for future urban operations. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

President'a Address to the Nation

This website contains the full text transcript of US President George W. Bush's televised address to the nation outlining future strategy in post war Iraq, broadcast on 10th January 2007. The speech outlines methods for tackling the insurgency including committing an extra twenty thousand American troops to Iraq; strengthening Iraqi security forces; assisting the Iraqi government in meeting political benchmarks; and assisting with diplomatic and economic initiatives in Iraq and the Middle East. The address can also be watched using Real Media or Windows Media video.

Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism

This site provides access to the full text pdf version of the Council on Foreign Relations Special Report number 11 written by Charles D. Ferguson and published in March 2006. The report discusses the threat of nuclear terrorist attacks and what counterterrorism measures need to be undertaken by the United States and the international community in order to prevent the buying, theft or manufacture of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials.

Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgncy : Lessons from Other Countries

This is the full text pdf version of a Strategic Studies Institute monograph published in June 2005 and written by Lawrence E. Cline. It examines pseudo operations; the use of government forces disguised as guerrillas to infiltrate insurgent areas. The report looks at lessons that can be learned from the use of this technique by countries other than the United States; the Huk insurrection in the Philippines from 1946 to 1955; the British campaign against the Malayan Races Liberation Army; the 1952 to 1960 British counterinsurgency campaign against the Mau Mau in Kenya; the French military in Indochina and Algeria; the Rhodesian insurgency; and issues raised by the use of pseudo guerillas.

Reconstruction Under Fire : Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency

This provides access ot a Rand Organization publication witten by David C. Gampert ...[et al] and dated 2009. Effective civilian relief, reconstruction, and development work can help convince people to support their government against insurgency. Knowing this, insurgents will target such work, threatening both those who perform it and those who benefit from it. Too often, the result is a postponement of efforts to improve government and serve the population until contested territory has been cleared of insurgents. This can lead to excessive reliance on force to defeat insurgents — delaying or even preventing success. A RAND team with combined security and development expertise set out to learn how civilian counterinsurgency (civil COIN) (essential human services, political reform, physical reconstruction, economic development, and indigenous capacity-building) could be conducted more safely in the face of active insurgency, when it can do the most good. The authors propose the following to improve the security of civil COIN under fire: a concept for setting priorities among civil COIN measures; a way to allocate security forces optimally among various civil COIN activities, as well as between them and other COIN security missions (e.g., direct operations against insurgents); new, integrated concepts of operation (ICONOPS) that military and civilian leaders could employ during COIN campaigns to manage risk and produce best results for COIN as a whole; and general requirements for capabilities and corresponding investments to secure civil COIN, derived from ICONOPS. [Taken from abstract]. The full text is available in PDF format so Adobe Acrobat software is required in order to read it.

Rethinking Counterinsurgency : Volume 5

This provides access to a Rand Organization Counterinsurgency Study document written by John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy dated 2008. During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom faced more insurgent activity than any other Western power. British government officials and military forces proved proficient at defeating or controlling these rebellions. However, these uprisings were much less complex than the modern jihadist insurgency. Past insurgent movements were primarily monolithic or national in form, had very specific local goals, and derived most of their power from the local population. These limitations made past rebellions vulnerable to strong military responses. In contrast, the modern jihadist insurgency is characterized by its complex and global nature. Unlike past insurgent forms that aspired to shape national politics, the jihadist movement espouses larger thematic goals, like overthrowing the global order. The modern jihadist insurgency is also more global in terms of its popular support and operational territory. It makes far better use of communications technology and propaganda to reach the minds and hearts of global audiences. The contemporary international security environment has therefore become a frustrating place for Western powers. Despite great technological and military advances, British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency. Operational failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for the West to rethink and retool its current COIN strategy. After analyzing past British COIN experiences and comparing them to the evolving nature of the modern jihadist insurgency, the authors suggest a new framework for future COIN operations. [Taken from abstract]. The full text is available in PDF format so Adobe Acrobat software is required in order to read it.

Securing an Open Society : Canada's National Security Policy

This site provides access to a pdf version of the report, Securing an Open Society issued by the Canadian Privy Council Office in April 2004. It is the first comprehensive statement made by Canada on National Security Policy and looks at Canadian national security interests and proposes a framework for dealing with national security threats. The chapters cover Canada's approach to national security, building an integrated security system, intelligence, emergency planning and management, public health emergencies, transportation security, border security, and international security.

Security, Terrorism and the UK

This is the full text pdf version of the Chatham House and the Economic and Social Research Foundation ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05/01 published on 18th July 2005 by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. This is a series of briefing papers produced under the New Security Challenges (NSC) programme. The paper is divided into four parts. The first, Riding Pillion for Tackling Terrorism is a High Risk Policy, written by Frank Gregory and Paul Wilkinson looks at Britain's performance in the War on Terrorism and counter terrorism policy and whether supporting the US-led invasion of Iraq put the UK more at risk from terrorist attack. The second part, Terrorism and Community Resilience - A UK Perspective, written by Bill Durodie, looks at the importance of literature examining human behaviour in disasters to policy makers and emergency planners. The third part written by Adrian Guelke, Whither the Peace Process in Northern Ireland?, looks at the NI peace process. The final and fourth part written by Sarah Oates and titled, Selling Fear? The Framing of Terrorist Threat in Elections, looks at terrorism and security concerns in recent elections.

Separatist, Para-Military, Military, Intelligence and Aid Organizations

This web site has grown from a network security consulting project into a list of terrorist organisations who make use of the internet (or at least have an internet presence) and ultimately includes freedom fighters on the side of good, and quasi-national groups as well as the military professionals and aid organisations of the title. There is a warning on the site that some organisations or government bodies who check http traffic may be averse to their employees exploring such sites.

Sharpest Sword : Compellence, Clausewitz and Counterinsurgency

This is a thesis written by Lt. Col. Michael Plehn USAF, which was presented to the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SASS), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama in May 2005. Compellence, Clausewitz, and Counterinsurgency—a seemingly strange trinity—in actuality, they are closely related subjects with particular relevance in today’s world. The United States has engaged in numerous compellent military actions during the decade of the 1990s; the first five years of the new millennium have seen this trend continue. Despite the country’s obvious affinity for this form of warfare, there is little written about it in U.S. military doctrine or strategy documents. Similarly, while a clear compellence construct exists within Carl von Clausewitz’s seminal book, On War—which is studied extensively in military academies and war colleges—the compellence aspects of Clausewitz’s work have not been identified as such previously, and consequently are not emphasized or taught to military officers and strategists. This paper corrects that shortfall and presents Clausewitz’s concept of compellence as a coherent framework. Furthermore, with an on-going counterinsurgency effort in Iraq, it is useful to examine the subject of insurgency and counterinsurgency from the standpoint of compellence. Using both Vietnam and the current insurgency in Iraq as case studies, this paper highlights the important compellent aspects of both wars. Finally, after examining all three of these topics, this paper concludes with recommendations for using airpower and other military and non-military instruments of power for employing and resisting compellence in counterinsurgency. It also recommends further education and inculcation of compellence concepts in military education courses and in joint military doctrine. [Taken from abstract]. The full text of the thesis is available in PDF format and is provided by the Air University ResearchWeb site.

Small Wars Journal

This site is a web portal and online resource for small wars researchers. The site provides access to the full text of the journal SWJ Magazine. There is also a reference library which provides access to full text books, articles and web site links on small wars, professional military education, terrorism, insurgency, urban operations, interagency operations, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Chechnya and the Vietnam War. There is also a listing of useful web sites for researchers in the field of small wars, a suggested reading list, blog and events calendar.

Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq

This is the full text pdf version of a Strategic Studies Institute monograph published in February 2005 and written by Dr W. Andrew Terrill. It looks at ethical and religious or sectarian differences in the post Saddam era in Iraq and the implications that a conflict or civil war could have on the regional stability of Iraq and the Middle East. The report looks at the challenge of avoiding ethno religious conflict; how an ethnic sectarian war could begin and develop in Iraq; the Shiite Sunni Arab divide in Iraq; Iraqi Kurdish and Turkoman ethnic challenges; dangers and opportunities to Iran that could result from an Iraqi civil war; implications for Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Gulf States; and the impact on the international oil market.

Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College

The SSI is the United States Army's institute for geostrategic and national security research and analysis, which supports the US Army War College curricula, provides analysis for Army and Department of Defense leadership, and interacts with the wider strategic community. The site provides information on the SSI and its activities; access to full text publications; and full text publications from the Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL), which covers academic research into key issues such as the Global War on Terrorism, national security strategy, landpower employment and force management and leadership.

Subversion and Insurgency. RAND Counterinsurgency Study — Paper 2

This technical report (OP-172-OSD) was published by The RAND Corporation in 2007 and was written by William Rosenau. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated intense interest in counterinsurgency within the U.S. armed forces, the intelligence community, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. However, subversion — a critical part of the repertoire of many insurgent groups — remains a neglected subject. This paper presents a set of case studies to explore the elements of subversion in-depth. It discusses preliminary ideas for combating subversive activities in the context of the “long war” against violent Islamist extremism and concludes with a discussion of how American support for countersubversion within authoritarian regimes can conflict with other important U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as the promotion of human rights. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

Terrorism and National Security : Issues and Trends

This is a a full text pdf version of a CRS Issue Brief for Congress, IB10119, written by Raphael Perl and updated in December 2004. The paper examines international terrorist actions and threats and the U.S. policy response. It looks at the recent developments; the War on Terrorism; US policy response and policy tools to combat international terrorism; and the US interagency coordination framework and programme response. This report has been superceded by CRS Report RL33600 'International Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response' dated August 2006.

The 'Al-Aqsa' Intifada : A Study in Fourth Generation Warfare

This site provides information about the background to the Palestinian uprising from September 2000 until the present. It contains geographical information about Israeli and Palestinian settlements, a chronological guide to the intifada and background economic, social and political information as well as details of casualties. It is produced by the Defense and National Interest group in the US.

The Urbanization of Insurgency : The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations

This technical report (MR-398-A) was published by The RAND Corporation in 1994 and was written by Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman. This report evaluates the effects of urbanization and population growth on the conduct of insurgency / counterinsurgency operations and assesses the U.S.�s ability to effectively support foreign nations� counterinsurgency activities. The report argues that as the dual demographic trends of rapid population growth and urbanization continue to change the face of the developing world, the likelihood of urban insurgency is increasing. It also argues that although urban insurgencies have traditionally been the easiest kind to defeat, that may no longer be the case. This means that governments, no longer able to simply rely on their urban counterterrorist or rural counterinsurgency strategies, will have to develop a hybrid strategy that prepares them to fight a broad-based insurgency across rural and urban environments. The report concludes that the United States can provide only limited support in these efforts, because it has neither the resources nor the will to become directly involved. The United States must realize that there are factors over which it has no control and that before committing its support to a counterinsurgency effort, it must determine how much it is willing to spend, how much it can control, how its efforts will be perceived, and the minimum outcome it will accept. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

The War Next Time : Countering Rogue States and Terrorists Armed with Chemical and Biological Weapons

This site provides access to the full text book edited by Dr Barry R. Schneider and Colonel (Dr.) Jim A. Davis, published by the United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center (USAF CPC) in April 2004. The book presents the hypothesis that United States future conflicts are likely to be unconventional wars, which may take the form of chemical or biological warfare or terrorism. The chapters look at asymmetrical rivals and threats; South Africa's chemical and biological weapons programme; US policy for retaliating to chem/bio attacks; methods to identify covert biological weapons programmes; the biocruise threat; and economic, social and psychological implications of a bioterrorism attack.

The War on Terror and the Cold War : They Are Not the Same

Written by John Tirman and published by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Center for International Studies in April 2006, this paper is one of a series of essays titled Audit of the Conventional Wisdom, which look at United States forein policy. It looks at the President Bush Administration's likening of the War on Terrorism to the Second World War confrontation with Nazi Germany and the Cold War struggle against Soviet communism. It argues that the global counter terrorism campaign and the current conflict in Iraq is very different and that the lessons from the two earlier conflicts are irrelevant to dealing with terrorism.

Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency : A Tale of Two Insurgencies

Written by James S. Corum and published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College in March 2006. This report analyses and contrasts the experience of the British in training and building indigenous police forces in Malaysia and Cyprus. In Malaysia, the strategy for training local security forces was very effective; this is in marked contrast to the experience in Cyprus which was unsuccessful. It then goes on to look at lessons that can be learned from these case studies and applied to United States counterinsurgency strategy.

UK Intelligence Community Online

This is a UK government website whose aim is to explain the United Kingdom national intelligence machinery. It provides an overview of intelligence provision in support of Government and law enforcement; how the various intelligence and security agencies work together such as GCHQ (Government Headquarters), MI5, SIS (Secret Intelligence Service), MoD Defence Intelligence Staff, JTAC (Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre), the Cabinet and the Home Office and access to their web sites; and provides details of the threat levels system which outlines the national security threat from international terrorism. It also provides access to full text publications; information on how to access intelligence records; and access to UK legislation.

Underkill : Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations amid Populations

This provides access to a Rand Organization publication written by David Gompert ...[et al] dated 2009. The battle for Gaza revealed an extremist strategy: hiding in cities and provoking attack to cause civilian deaths that can be blamed on the attacking forces. The U.S. and allied militaries, having no options but lethal force or no options at all, are ill-equipped to defeat this strategy. The use of lethal force in dense populations can harm and alienate the very people whose cooperation U.S. forces are trying to earn. To solve this problem, a new RAND study proposes a “continuum of force” — a suite of capabilities that includes sound, light, lasers, cell phones, and video cameras. In missions ranging from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping to humanitarian intervention to quelling disorder, the typical small unit of the U.S. military should and can have portable, easy-to-use, all-purpose capabilities to carry out its missions without killing or hurting civilians that may get in the way. The technologies for these capabilities are available but have not been recognized as a solution to this strategic problem and, consequently, need more high-level attention and funding. [Taken from abstract]. The full text is available in PDF format so Adobe Acrobat software is requred in order to read it.

Undermining Terrorism

Undermining Terrorism is a portal for research on terrorism and is maintained by the John F. Kennedy School of Government, at Harvard University. It provides access to a wealth of resources relating to all aspects of terrorism and counter -terrorism. Topics include news stories, details of new legislation, conference reports and full text articles, commentary and reports. Topics covered include: American homeland security and counter-terrorism preparation, international security and diplomacy, analysis of threats from specific terrorist organizations, nuclear , chemical and biological terrorism. It should be noted that some materials are in pdf format and therefore require access to an Adobe Acrobat Reader for use.

Understanding Proto-Insurgencies. RAND Counterinsurgency Study - Paper 3

This report (OP-178-OSD) was produced by The RAND Corporation in 2007 and was written by Daniel Byman. To gain the size and capabilities of an insurgency, a would-be insurgent movement must create a politically relevant identity; it must espouse a cause that is popular beyond the group; it must gain dominance over rival organizations; and it must find a sanctuary that provides respite from police, intelligence, and military services. Violence is instrumental in all the tasks proto-insurgencies seek to accomplish. However, violence can also backfire on them, since few people support it. Support from outside states offers numerous advantages to groups seeking to become insurgencies. It can provide safe haven, money, training, and help with political mobilization. It can also help groups overcome logistical difficulties, hinder intelligence-gathering against them, and legitimize them, making government delegitimization efforts almost impossible. Outside states, however, often deliberately try to control or even weaken the group and at times can reduce its political popularity. The reaction of the state is often the most important factor in a movement’s overall success. Perhaps the best and most efficient way to prevent proto-insurgents from gaining ground is through in-group policing, since groups know their own members and can enable arrests or other forms of pressure. The government can also promote rival identities. Governments must, however, recognize the proto-insurgents’ weaknesses and avoid overreaction that may inadvertently strengthen them. The most obvious action for the United States is to anticipate the possibility of an insurgency developing before it materializes. It can also provide behind-the-scenes training and advisory programs and can help inhibit outside support. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

Vicious Circle : The Dynamics of Occupation and Resistance in Iraq : Part One : Patterns of Popular Discontent

Written by Carl Conetta, this is a Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA) Research Monograph number 10, published on 18th May 2005. The report analyses Iraqi public opinion data and interviews about coaltion military activity in post war Iraq. It is found that a vicious circle has been created where counterinsurgency measures are feeding the insurgency further. The chapters look at Iraqi public sentiments on the occupation; what drives oppositional sentiment; variations in Iraqi public opinion by region and community; the foundations of Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni opinion and opposition; and patterns of coalition military activity.

War by Other Means - Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency

This technical report (MG-595/2-OSD) was produced by The RAND Corporation in 2008 and was written by David C. Gompert, John Gordon, IV, Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns and Robert E. Hunter. The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report’s recommendations are based on the premise that counterinsurgency (COIN) is a contest for the allegiance of a nation’s population; victory over jihadist insurgency consists not of merely winning a war against terrorists but of persuading Islamic populations to choose legitimate government and reject violent religious tyranny. The authors evaluate three types of COIN capabilities: civil capabilities to help weak states improve their political and economic performance; informational and cognitive capabilities to enable better governance and improve COIN decisionmaking; and security capabilities to protect people and infrastructure and to weaken insurgent forces. Gompert and Gordon warn that U.S. capabilities are deficient in several critical areas but also emphasize that U.S. allies and international organizations can provide capabilities that the United States currently cannot. The authors conclude by outlining the investments, organizational changes within the federal government and the military, and international arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities. [Taken from abstract]. This is a PDF file, so Adobe Acrobat software will be required in order to read it.

War by Other Means : Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency : Final Report

This provides access to a Rand Counterinsurgengy Study report written by David C Gompert ...[et al] and dated 2008. The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report’s recommendations are based on the premise that counterinsurgency (COIN) is a contest for the allegiance of a nation’s population; victory over jihadist insurgency consists not of merely winning a war against terrorists but of persuading Islamic populations to choose legitimate government and reject violent religious tyranny. The authors evaluate three types of COIN capabilities: civil capabilities to help weak states improve their political and economic performance; informational and cognitive capabilities to enable better governance and improve COIN decisionmaking; and security capabilities to protect people and infrastructure and to weaken insurgent forces. Gompert and Gordon warn that U.S. capabilities are deficient in several critical areas but also emphasize that U.S. allies and international organizations can provide capabilities that the United States currently cannot. The authors conclude by outlining the investments, organizational changes within the federal government and the military, and international arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities. [Taken from abstract]. The full text is available in PDF format so Adobe Acrobat software is required in order to read it.

WZM - WOLVERINE 8x8 Vehicles, Upgrade and Modernisation of Military Vehicles

A technical brief containing background on the latest UK military vehicle in use in Afghanistan (April 2008). The new vehicles offer a much improved capability over the the existing Land Rover based Weapons Mount Installation Kit, (WIMIK). The vehicle has mproved armour, off-road and load-carrying capability. It also has improved technology suited to the reconnaissance and close fire support roles for which it will be used. This brief is an overview of the Wolverine family of vehicles of which 'Jackal' is the reconnaissance design (BRDM-2M96iK), with specifications is from army-technology.com.

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